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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The aftershocks of September 11, 2001, reverberated deep within 
U.S. society. The horrific events of that day led to over 3,000 innocent 
lives lost and changed the American psyche. Instant changes to the 
New York skyline, air travel, and the general sense of security were 
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apparent to all, as was the outpouring of support from around the 
world.  
 However, some changes were not so readily apparent. The mili-
tary commissions set up by the President to try individuals deemed 
to be “unlawful enemy combatants”1 are one example. Indeed, many 
Americans did not know of or understand these commissions until 
the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 that they violated 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions. The Supreme Court decision did not put an end 
to the military commissions, but rather forced the President to go to 
Congress to get authorization for continued use of the commissions. 
In response to President Bush’s request, Congress passed the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006.3 
 Human rights organizations and the international community 
have criticized the Military Commissions Act for failing to meet the 
minimum standards required by the Geneva Conventions Common 
Article 3. While the Act has many flaws regarding due process and 
overreaching provisions, this Comment focuses on the Act’s treat-
ment of rape and sexual violence. Specifically, it looks at how the 
treatment of rape and sexual violence runs contrary to international 
standards and why this does not make good policy.  
 Part II of this Comment demonstrates how prohibitions of rape 
and sexual violence during wartime have evolved in international 
law. Part III addresses how the Act’s treatment runs contrary to 
those standards, and Part IV provides a critique on the policy created 
by the Act.  
II.   THE EVOLUTION OF RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN  
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 Traditionally, rape was viewed as a crime of passion, not a crime 
of violence.4 During wartime, rape and sexual violence was consid-
ered a natural consequence of war,5 and soldiers treated women as 
“booty of war.”6 Nations often treated sexual violence as a reward or 
necessity for soldiers, a modern egregious example being the forced 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Military Commissions Act of 2006, §948(a), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006). 
 2. 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 3. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 4. See Rhonda Copelon, International Human Rights Dimensions of Intimate Vio-
lence: Another Strand in the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 865, 866 (2003) (stating how rape “was treated as a personal matter”). 
 5. Hon. Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 277, 279 (2002). 
 6. Peggy Kuo, Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International Tribunal, 
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 305 (2002). 
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prostitution of thousands of comfort women for the Japanese mili-
tary.7 
 In the United States, however, the prohibition of rape and sexual 
violence during wartime can be traced back to the United States 
Civil War when President Lincoln enacted the Lieber Code to control 
the conduct of Union soldiers.8 Article 44 states:  
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded 
country, all destruction of property not commanded by the author-
ized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a 
place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such 
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such 
other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of 
the offense.  
A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, 
and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be 
lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.9 
 Notwithstanding this explicit prohibition of rape, most laws im-
pliedly prohibited rape rather than prohibiting it outright. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Hague Convention of 190710 implied such a prohi-
bition as respect for and protection of “family honor and rights.”11 
Furthermore, while the Nuremburg and Tokyo Charters did not 
mention rape12 and there was no specific mention of rape in the re-
spective judgments, the trials included evidence of rape as part of the 
“greater atrocities committed.”13  
 However, the charter establishing the war crimes trials in Ger-
many by the occupying powers, Control Council Law No. 10, ex-
pressly included rape as a war crime.14 Despite this precedent, the 
Geneva Conventions, while expressly prohibiting rape in both the  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 7. Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 424, 425 (1993). 
 8. Kuo, supra note 6, at 306. 
 9. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Gen. Orders No. 100, art. 44 (1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 10 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988), available at 
http://www.civilwarhome.com/liebercode.htm.  
 10. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 46, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.  
 11. Kuo, supra note 6, at 306. 
 12. Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value 
of Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, 300 (2002). 
 13. Kuo, supra note 6, at 307. 
 14. Control Council for Germany, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50, reprinted in 
60 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF 
WAR 304 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979).  
530 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:527 
 
Fourth Geneva Convention15 and the Additional Protocols,16 do not 
specifically enumerate rape as a grave breach. While categorization 
of a grave breach is important to determine state obligations and 
whether rape can rise to a level of a preemptory norm,17 the U.S. 
State Department has stated that rape is a war crime that can be 
prosecuted under customary international law and the Geneva Con-
ventions.18 Moreover, international criminal tribunals, such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have 
interpreted rape and sexual assault similarly.19  
A.   International Criminal Tribunals 
 The United Nations Security Council created the ICTY20 and 
ICTR21 as a result of the horrific crimes against humanity and geno-
cide, including rape and sexual violence, in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. In fact, it was the reaction to the massive and systemic 
rape of women in the Balkans that led to the first condemnation by 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 76(1), adopted on June 8, 
1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391; id., art. 4(2)(e), 16 I.L.M. 1442. 
 17. See Sellers, supra note 12, at 297-98.  
 18. Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, 
to Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 27, 1993), quoted in Meron, supra note 7, at 427 n.22. The 
Department stated: 
  We believe that there is no need to amend the Geneva Conventions to ac-
complish the objectives stated in your letter, however, because the legal ba-
sis for prosecuting troops for rape is well established under the Geneva 
Conventions and customary international law. As stated in the authorita-
tive Department of the Army Law of War Manual, any violation of the Ge-
neva Conventions is a war crime (FM 27-10, para. 499.). Article 27 of the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War provides that women shall be “especially protected . . . against rape.” 
Article 13 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War provides that prisoners “must at all times be protected, particularly 
against acts of violence”; article 14 requires that women “be treated with all 
the regard due to their sex.” Both Conventions list grave breaches, including 
willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and (with regard to civilians) 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. Under 
the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, all parties to an 
international conflict (including all parties to the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia) are required either to try persons alleged to have committed 
grave breaches or to extradite them to a party that will. 
  In our reports to the United Nations on human rights violations in the 
former Yugoslavia, we have reported sexual assaults as grave breaches. We 
will continue to do so and will continue to press the international commu-
nity to respond to the terrible sexual atrocities in the former Yugoslavia. 
Id.  
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). 
 21. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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the Security Council of wartime rape22 and the subsequent estab-
lishment of the tribunal.23 The statutes creating these ad hoc crimi-
nal tribunals with limited jurisdiction listed rape as a crime against 
humanity. However, it is the tribunals’ jurisprudence that has sig-
nificantly advanced international law in prosecuting rape and sexual 
violence as war crimes.  
1.   Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR) 
 The first conviction of rape as a war crime came from the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu.24 Jean-Paul Akayesu was the bourgmestre (the principle 
magistrate, comparable to a mayor) of the Taba commune in Rwanda 
from 1993 until 1994, during which Tutsis massacred, raped, and 
tortured Hutus.25 Traditionally, the commune treated the bourg-
mestre with great respect.26 As a result, Akayesu had extensive pow-
ers, including maintaining law and order in the commune, as well as 
effective control of the communal police.27 Indeed, women and girls 
seeking refuge from the horrific atrocities occurring during that time 
came to him because of his position in the commune.28 However, the 
ICTR Trial Chamber found that Akayesu, instead of providing a safe 
haven, often encouraged or assented to the raping and forced nudity 
of the women and girls who were seeking protection.29 The Chamber 
held Akayesu guilty of nine counts of genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and violations of the Geneva Conventions.30  
 His was the first conviction ever for genocide, and it was the first 
time that an international tribunal ruled that rape and other forms 
of sexual violence could constitute genocide.31 The Chamber under-
scored the fact that rape and sexual violence may “constitute geno-
cide in the same way as any other act [of serious bodily or mental 
harm,] as long as [such acts] were committed with the specific intent 
to destroy . . . a particular group, targeted as such.”32 Moreover, the 
Chamber held that rape is a violation of personal dignity and consti-
tutes torture when instigated or consented to by a public official for 
                                                                                                                     
 22. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 23. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 278. 
 24. Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 25. Id. ¶ 1. 
 26. Id. ¶ 54. 
 27. Id. ¶ 56. 
 28. Id. ¶ 422. 
 29. Id. § 5.5. 
 30. Id. § 8. 
 31. ICTR Press Briefing, ICTR in Context: Policy and Achievements, ICTR/INFO-9-
13-018 (Oct. 19, 2000). 
 32. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 731. 
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purposes of interrogation, information, humiliation, or degradation.33 
By likening rape to torture, the Chamber delivered the first convic-
tion of an individual for rape as a crime against humanity.34 
 In reaching this monumental decision, the Chamber was the first 
to expressly define rape.35 In doing so, it refused to define rape as a 
“mechanical description of objects and body parts” and instead held 
that rape did not require any act of penetration of or by a sexual or-
gan.36 The judges defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual na-
ture, committed on a person under circumstances which are coer-
cive.”37 The Chamber held that a showing of physical force was not 
necessary to demonstrate coercion, but that “[t]hreats, intimidation, 
extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation 
may constitute coercion . . . .”38 It concluded that certain circum-
stances, such as armed conflict and presence of the military, were in-
herently coercive and could therefore constitute coercion.39  
 Furthermore, the Chamber found that “[s]exual violence . . . is 
considered to be any act of a sexual nature, which is committed on a 
person under circumstances which are coercive.”40 Again the Cham-
ber noted physical force was not necessary to show coercion and fur-
ther held physical contact was not necessary to find a crime of sexual 
violence.41 Therefore, it found that ordering a student to undress and 
perform gymnastics in public while naked constituted sexual vio-
lence.42  
 Human rights organizations heralded this decision as a victory for 
prosecuting rape and sexual violence as a war crime and for demon-
strating that these egregious acts do constitute torture, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide.43 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Id. ¶ 597. 
 34. Id. ¶ 695. 
 35. See Goldstone, supra note 5, at 283 (“International law had never defined the 
crime of rape. That, in itself, is significant. A crime that had been occurring for centuries 
during wars had never received sufficient attention to justify definition. In Akayesu, the 
Trial Chamber of the Rwanda Tribunal took a major step toward filling this gap in the 
law.”). 
 36. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 597.  
 37. Id. ¶ 598. 
 38. Id. ¶ 688. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. ¶ 598. 
 41. Id. ¶ 688. 
 42. Id. 
 43. AMNESTY INT’L, SUDAN, DARFUR: RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR—SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ 
AFR54/076/2004. 
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2.   Prosecutor v. Furundzija (ICTY) 
 In Prosecutor v. Furundzija,44 the Yugoslavia Tribunal relied on 
the progressive definition adopted in Akayesu but recast the defini-
tion of rape to require penetration as an element of the offense.45 The 
Trial Chamber convicted a Croatian commander for torture and out-
rages upon personal dignity for a single act of rape even though the 
accused did not personally rape the woman.46  
 In that case, the accused commander interrogated a naked Mus-
lim woman while another soldier rubbed his knife against her thighs 
and threatened that he would put his knife inside her vagina.47 She 
was then moved to another room where the accused commander con-
tinued to interrogate her and another soldier repeatedly raped her 
orally, vaginally, and anally in front of her friend and a group of sol-
diers.48  
 The Trial Chamber found that the victim “suffered severe physical 
and mental pain, along with public humiliation, at the hands of Ac-
cused B in what amounted to outrages upon her personal dignity and 
sexual integrity.”49 The Chamber defined rape as penetration under 
force, threat of force, or coercive circumstances and found that the 
elements of rape were met.50 Moreover, the Chamber held that, while 
the commander did not personally commit the act of rape on the vic-
tim, he contributed to the acts by his continued interrogations and by 
not stopping or curtailing these actions being committed in his pres-
ence.51  
 While this case held that a single act of rape was an outrage upon 
personal dignity (which was a war crime), it did not state outright 
that rape, in and of itself, is a war crime.52 However, it did find that 
forcible oral sex is “[a] most humiliating and degrading attack upon 
human dignity” and, thus, could correctly be included in the defini-
tion of rape.53 Finally, the court held that sexual assault could consti-
tute a war crime and that rape may be a war crime or act of genocide 
if other essential elements are met.54 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998). 
 45. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 284. 
 46. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 273-275. 
 47. Id. ¶ 40. 
 48. Id. ¶ 41. 
 49. Id. ¶ 272. 
 50. Id. ¶ 185. 
 51. Id. ¶ 273. 
 52. Kuo, supra note 6, at 314. 
 53. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 183. 
 54. Id. at ¶ 172. 
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3.   Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic (Foca) (ICTY) 
 With the increasing prosecution of rape cases in the ICTY and 
ICTR, and each tribunal’s respective contributions to interpreting in-
ternational law, the ICTY subsequently held that rape, in and of it-
self, is a war crime.55 This occurred in the Kunarac, Kovac and 
Vukovic (Foca)56 case, sometimes referred to as the Foca rape camp 
case.  
 Shortly after the Bosnian War broke out, Bosnian Serb and Yugo-
slav armed forces sexually enslaved and systematically raped Mus-
lim women and girls as young as twelve in Foca, a former town of 
Yugoslavia.57 Women and girls testified to horrific acts of sexual vio-
lence that ensued during this time. For example, a mother testified 
how she was forced to turn over her 15-year-old daughter to soldiers 
who raped her.58 Young girls testified how they were enslaved in the 
homes of military commanders and repeatedly raped by soldiers who 
could come and go as they pleased.59 The Trial Chamber found that 
the evidence showed “Muslim women and girls, mothers and daugh-
ters together, robbed of the last vestiges of human dignity, women 
and girls treated like chattels, pieces of property at the arbitrary dis-
posal of the Serb occupation forces, and more specifically, at the beck 
and call of the three accused.”60 
 Surveying the domestic laws of countries such as India, Belgium, 
South Africa, Uruguay, and Estonia, the Chamber defined rape dif-
ferently than in Furundzija or Akayesu by describing rape as sexual 
penetration without the consent of the victim.61 The Chamber further 
stated that consent had to be given “voluntarily, as a result of the 
victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circum-
stances.”62 The Chamber’s progressive definition of consent takes into 
account whether the victim’s will was freely and voluntarily given 
and whether the victim was in detention, subject to psychological 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Kuo, supra note 6, at 314. 
 56. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, 
Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Foca]. 
 57. See Amnesty International USA, Rape as a Tool of War: A Fact Sheet, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/Violence/Womens_Human_Rights/page.do?id=1108441&n1=3
&n2=39&n3=739 (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Amnesty International Fact 
Sheet]. 
 58. Kuo, supra note 6, at 315. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Press Release, The Hague, Judgment of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovac 
and Vukovic Case (Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p566-
e.htm.  
 61. Kuo, supra note 6, at 319 (explaining Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 453-56). 
 62. Id. (quoting Foca, supra note 56, ¶ 460). 
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pressure, or subject to any other condition where consent could not 
truly be given.63 
 The Trial Chamber in Foca convicted the accused military officials 
Kunarac and Vukovic of rape and torture as both a crime against 
humanity and a war crime.64 It also stated that rape could be a form 
of enslavement65 and convicted Kunarac and Kovac of enslavement 
as a crime against humanity.66 
 Upon appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the “ ‘resis-
tance’ requirement,” finding that use of force was not a necessary 
element of rape.67 Instead, in the Foca Appeal decision, the Chamber 
found that nonconsent of a victim was sufficient to establish rape.68 
B.   International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) was not created by the U.N. Security Council, but rather by a 
multilateral agreement, the Treaty of Rome (Rome Statute).69 Also, 
unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is a permanent court with a 
wider range of jurisdiction, including rape and sexual violence.70 The 
ICC explicitly lists rape and sexual violence as war crimes in both in-
ternational and noninternational armed conflict,71 as a crime against 
humanity,72 and possibly even an element of genocide.73 Generally, 
the ICC defines rape as penetration by force, threat of force, coercion, 
or where there is no consent.74 Sexual violence is defined as an act of 
a sexual nature by force, threat of force, coercion, or without con-
sent.75  
 It is clear that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals influ-
enced the ICC’s treatment of rape and sexual violence. And it is 
equally clear that the permanent court has advanced the tribunals’ 
work. As Justice Goldstone writes, “This is significant in that the 
Rome Statute for the ICC represents the normative benchmark of in-
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. 
 64. Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 883, 886, 888. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 539-43. 
 66.  Id. ¶¶ 883, 886. 
 67. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23, IT-96-23/1-A, Ap-
peals Judgment, ¶ 128 (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter Foca Appeal]. 
 68. Id. ¶ 133. 
 69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
 70. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
 71. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). 
 72. Id. art. 7(1)(g). 
 73. Id. art. 6. 
 74. INT’L CRIMINAL CT., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, arts. 
7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 (2000) [hereinafter ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES].  
 75. Id. arts. 7(1)(g)-6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6, 8(2)(e)(vi)-6. 
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ternational criminal law, and gender crimes are now given the rec-
ognition they were denied for so many years.”76 
C.   International Standard for Prohibition of Rape and Sexual 
Violence During Wartime 
 While it is unsettled whether the prohibition of rape and sexual 
violence during wartime, by itself, has risen to the level of jus co-
gens,77 it is clear that, at a minimum, it has crystallized into custom-
ary international law.78 Treaties, international tribunals, and the 
ICC all recognize that rape and sexual assault can constitute torture; 
cruel, degrading, and humiliating treatment; crimes against human-
ity; and even genocide. Equally clear is that through the jurispru-
dence of the international tribunals and subsequent codification in 
the Rome Statute, rape and sexual violence involve either penetra-
tion or an act of a sexual nature without the consent of the victim, 
taking into account the totality of circumstances.  
III.   INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS TAKE ONE STEP FORWARD, THE 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 TAKES TWO STEPS BACKWARD 
A.   Military Commissions Act of 2006: Background and Overview 
 The Military Commissions Act of 200679 was a reaction to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld80 in which the Su-
preme Court found that the military commissions set up by the 
President shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks violated both 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Con-
ventions.81 
 In Hamdan, a Yemeni national and alleged Al-Qaeda member was 
captured by militias in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. mili-
tary.82 Two years after the U.S. sent Hamdan to Guantanamo Bay, 
the President determined that a military commission could try him 
for charges of conspiracy.83  
                                                                                                                     
 76. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 285. 
 77. See BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY, at xx (2005) (de-
fines jus cogens as “[p]eremptory norms of general international law from which no deroga-
tion is permissible” such as prohibition of force and genocide).  
 78. Sellers, supra note 12, at 302-03 (arguing that, while there is “a general norm 
prohibiting rape during times of armed conflict,” rape of its own volition has not risen to 
jus cogens); see also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 168 
(Dec. 10, 1998) (noting that the prohibition of rape and serious sexual assault during war-
time has risen to customary international law). 
 79. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 80. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 81. Id. at 2759. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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 The Supreme Court found that absent a military exigency, which 
the Court found did not exist in Hamdan’s case, the President did not 
have unilateral power to set up military commissions without con-
gressional approval.84 Moreover, without deciding whether the Ge-
neva Conventions were self-executing, the Court found Common Ar-
ticle 3 was judicially recognized by reference to the customary laws of 
war provision in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.85 In doing so, 
the Court determined that detainees must be provided with the nec-
essary “ ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples.’ ”86 The Court held that the structure and proce-
dures of the military commissions, which barred the presence of the 
accused and denied the accused an opportunity to view the evidence 
against him, did not meet such standards.87 Furthermore, the Court 
rejected the U.S. government’s argument that Common Article 3 did 
not apply to the treatment of the detainees. The Court held that 
while Al-Qaeda is a transnational group, Common Article 3’s “conflict 
not of an international character” provision has been interpreted to 
apply to all residual conflict that does not fall within the traditional 
conflict among states.88 Therefore, the Court held that the Geneva 
Conventions governed detainee treatment.89 
 While many viewed this decision as a rebuke to the Bush Admini-
stration’s assertion of broad executive power in dealing with detain-
ees,90 it clearly allowed the President to go to Congress to authorize 
such power. To that end, Congress passed the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, and the President signed it into law on October 17, 
2006.91  
                                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 2780. 
 85. Id. at 2796. 
 86. Id. (quoting Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, art. 3, ¶1(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). 
 87. Id. at 2797-98. 
 88. Id. at 2795; John P. Cerone, Status of Detainees in Non-International Armed Con-
flict, and their Protection in the Course of Criminal Proceedings: The Case of Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 10 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (2006), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/ 
insights060714.html.  
 89. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795; see also Cerone, supra note 88 (noting that the hold-
ing of the Court is limited to the conflict in Afghanistan and does not apply to any other 
conflict regarding the war on terror). 
 90. E.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Hidden—and Obvious—Lessons in the Supreme Court’s 
Divided Ruling Invalidating Military Commissions, FINDLAW’S WRIT, June 30, 2006, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20060630.html. 
 91. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“An 
Act To authorize trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other 
purposes.”); see also John B. Bellinger III, State Dept. Legal Advisor, Foreign Center Press 
Briefing, Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/74786.htm (stating that, pursu-
ant to the Hamdan decision, the President needed legislation to set up the military com-
missions). 
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 The Military Commissions Act (MCA) amends the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the War Crimes Act.92 It authorizes 
and provides procedures for military commissions to be used against 
“unlawful enemy combatant[s].”93 Some of the most controversial 
provisions include authorizing the President to define who is an 
“unlawful enemy combatant,”94 eliminating the writ of habeas corpus 
for any alien combatant,95 and allowing an exception for the use of 
“reliable” coerced evidence.96  
 Also, because the Supreme Court found that Common Article 3 
applied to the treatment of detainees, the MCA amended the War 
Crimes Act.97 The War Crimes Act criminalizes war crimes commit-
ted by U.S. nationals.98 Prior to the MCA, the War Crimes Act de-
fined war crimes as conduct “which constitutes a grave breach of 
common Article 3.”99 However, the MCA amends this provision to de-
fine war crimes as “a grave breach of common Article 3” and specifi-
cally enumerates and defines nine offenses that constitute such a 
grave breach, including “Torture,” “Cruel or Inhuman Treatment,” 
“Rape,” and “Sexual Assault or Abuse.”100 In listing these offenses, 
the MCA excluded the bedrock principle of Common Article 3—
prohibition of “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humili-
ating and degrading treatment.”101 According to the government, this 
was necessary in order to clarify otherwise “vague” requirements.102 
However, critics charge that the MCA’s treatment of Common Article 
3 has less to do with providing clarity to “vague” requirements and 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Military Commissions Act §§ 3-5, 6(b). 
 93. Id. § 948d(a). 
 94. Id. § 948d(c). 
 95. Id. § 950j(b).  
 96. Id. § 948r.  
 97. War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).  
 98. Id. § 2441(b). 
 99. Id. § 2441(c)(3). 
 100. Military Commissions Act § 950v(b). 
 101. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3(1)(c), 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Common Article 3]. 
 102. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Press conference of the President (Sept. 15, 2006) 
[hereinafter Pres. Bush Press Conference], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2006/09/20060915-2.html (“This debate is occurring because of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling that said that we must conduct ourselves under the Common Article III of 
the Geneva Convention. And that Common Article III says that there will be no outrages 
upon human dignity. It’s very vague. What does that mean, ‘outrages upon human dig-
nity’? That’s a statement that is wide open to interpretation. And what I’m proposing is 
that there be clarity in the law so that our professionals will have no doubt that that which 
they are doing is legal. You know, it’s -- and so the piece of legislation I sent up there pro-
vides our professionals that which is needed to go forward.”); see also Bellinger, supra note 
91 (stating the MCA clarifies exactly what is required because Common Article 3 provi-
sions are vague). 
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more to do with providing a shield of impunity for detainee mis-
treatment.103    
 Furthermore, the MCA self-declares that changes to the UCMJ 
and War Crimes Act meet the standards and obligations set forth by 
the Geneva Conventions.104 First, it states, “A military commission 
established under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, af-
fording all the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions.”105 Second, the Act provides that this 
criminalization “fully satisf[ies] the obligation under Article 129 of 
the Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide effec-
tive penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in 
common Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict not of an inter-
national character.”106 It further insulates itself by prohibiting the 
use of the Geneva Conventions as a source to be used against the 
U.S. government or any official.107 Moreover, it limits how U.S. courts 
can interpret the prohibitions by barring the use of foreign or inter-
national sources of law.108 
B.   Treatment of Rape and Sexual Assault in the MCA as Compared 
to International Standards 
 As noted above, rape and sexual assault are expressly included in 
the Military Commissions Act, both as a crime for which an unlawful 
enemy combatant can be tried before a military commission and as a 
war crime for which a U.S. national can be prosecuted in U.S. federal 
courts.109 However, it is not the expressed inclusion of these crimes, 
but rather how the Act defines these offenses and excludes “outrages 
upon personal dignity”110 that are in stark contrast to international 
standards of rape and sexual assault. 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See John P. Cerone, Military Commissions Act of 2006: Examining the Relation-
ship Between the International Law of Armed Conflict and US Law, 10 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L 
L. INSIGHT (2006), http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/11/insights061114.html (suggesting 
that amending the War Crimes Act was necessary because once it was held that Common 
Article 3 applied to the treatment of detainees the possibility of prosecution was open for 
detainee mistreatment); see also R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce 
Threat of Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/08/AR2006080801276.html 
(reporting that U.S. officials were worried that CIA officers, former military personnel, and 
political appointees would face prosecution under the War Crimes Act for detainee treat-
ment that could constitute a violation of Common Article 3’s prohibition of outrages upon 
personal dignity). 
 104. Military Commissions Act § 948(b)(f). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. § 6(a)(2). 
 107. Id. § 948b(g). 
 108. Id. § 6(a)(2); Cerone, supra note 103. 
 109. Military Commissions Act §§ 950v(b), 6(b)(1)(B)(d).  
 110. Common Article 3, supra note 101. 
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1.   Narrow Definition of Rape 
 The MCA defines rape as the act of a person “who forcibly or with 
coercion or threat of force wrongfully invades the body of a person by 
penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of the vic-
tim with any part of the body of the accused, or with any foreign ob-
ject . . . .”111  
 While the MCA’s requirement of penetration is a far cry from the 
progressive nonmechanical manner in which the ICTR defined 
rape,112 it finds support in both the ICTY113 and ICC.114 However, 
unlike either the ICTY or ICC, the MCA narrows and restricts the 
definition of rape contrary to international standards in two ways: (1) 
it only recognizes forcible or coercive rape and not other forms of non-
consensual rape115 and (2) it does not recognize forcible oral sex as 
rape.  
 First, the MCA’s requirement that rape involves penetration         
“ ‘forcibly or with coercion or threat of force’ ” severely limits the 
widely accepted understanding that rape occurs in many other non-
consensual forms.116 While the MCA’s definition of penetration by 
force, threat of force, or coercion clearly recognizes the underlying 
principle that rape occurs when a sexual act is nonconsensual, it fails 
to recognize that nonconsensual sex can occur without force. In other 
words, while force or coercion may be per se evidence of nonconsen-
sual sex, other circumstances may be so inherently coercive that they 
do not require proof of force, coercion, or threat of force to show non-
consent.117  
                                                                                                                     
 111. Id. § 950v(b)(21) (emphasis added). 
 112. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(defining rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under cir-
cumstances which are coercive”).  
 113. Foca, supra note 56, ¶ 460 (defining rape as “sexual penetration . . . without the 
consent of the victim”). 
 114. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-1(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(1), 
8(2)(e)(vi)-1(1) (defining an element of rape as “[t]he perpetrator invaded the body of a per-
son by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the vic-
tim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim 
with any object or any other part of the body”). 
 115. See Rhonda Copelon, Under the Radar Screen—Rape and Sexualized Violence and 
the Geneva Conventions, WOMEN’S MEDIA CTR., Sept. 27, 2006, 
http://www.womensmediacenter.com/ex/092706.html (stating the MCA’s definition of rape 
is contrary to international and domestic definitions); see also Press Release, Center for 
Constitutional Rights, Bush Signs the Military Commissions Act: CCR Calls it a Blow to 
Democracy and the Constitution, Oct. 17, 2006 [hereinafter CCR Press Release] (on file 
with author) (stating that the MCA “defines rape and sexual abuse in a manner that is in-
consistent with international law, turning back the clock on the hard-fought victories of 
survivors of sexual violence”).  
 116. See Copelon, supra note 115 (quoting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-366, §§ 950v(b)(21), 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(G), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)). 
 117. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 271 (Dec. 
10, 1998) (finding that “any form of captivity vitiates consent”). 
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 This was clearly the situation in the Foca case, where military 
personnel brutally raped and sexually enslaved women and girls in 
brothel-like internment camps.118 In that case, a deputy commander 
forced a 19-year-old girl to initiate sexual acts on his superior.119 The 
superior, a defendant in the case, raised the defense that he did not 
rape the girl, but rather he succumbed to her sexual advances.120 In 
rejecting his defense, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the de-
plorable circumstances of the camp, including rampant rapings and 
extra brutality to those that resisted, were so coercive in nature that 
genuine consent by the victim was impossible.121 In reaching this de-
cision, the Chamber recognized that rape often occurs where the vic-
tim acquiesces against her will due to coercive circumstances and not 
necessarily due to direct force or coercion.122  
 The ICTR Appeals Chamber adopted and affirmed the Foca Ap-
peal decision in the Gacumbitsi case.123 In Gacumbitsi, the Chamber 
stated that Foca Appeal established nonconsent as an element of 
rape as a crime against humanity.124 In doing so, the Chamber re-
jected the Prosecutor’s argument that consent should be an affirma-
tive defense with the burden on the accused.125 Despite the holding, 
the Chamber stated that showing existence of coercive circumstances 
under which genuine consent is not possible could prove noncon-
sent.126 The Chamber thereby recognized the “coercive circum-
stances” standard adopted by the ICTR in Akayesu.127 
 Consent may still be raised as a defense to a charge of rape and 
sexual assault in both the ICTY and ICTR. However, consent cannot 
be a defense if the victim experienced or had reason to fear violence, 
duress, detention, or psychological oppression.128 Therefore, while 
consent may be raised as a defense, the burden of proof is placed on 
the defendant and is a high one to overcome. The defendant must 
                                                                                                                     
 118. See Foca, supra note 56. 
 119. Kuo, supra note 6, at 318. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Foca Appeal, supra note 67, ¶ 132. 
 122. Id. ¶ 127. 
 123. Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Judgment (July 7, 
2006). 
 124. Id. ¶ 153. 
 125. Id. ¶ 147. 
 126. Id. ¶ 155. 
 127. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
 128. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE, 
Rule 96(ii), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1, June 29, 1995, available at http://www.ictr.org/ 
ENGLISH/rules/index.htm (“[C]onsent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim a) has 
been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention 
or psychological oppression, or b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, an-
other might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear.”). 
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prove why consent in a wartime situation is relevant and further 
that the actual evidence is credible.129  
 Similarly, the Rome Statute of the ICC includes a broad provision 
of nonconsent, including force, coercion, coercive environments, and 
inability to provide genuine consent as sufficient to establish ele-
ments of rape as a war crime or crimes against humanity.130 This in-
cludes circumstances where sex is performed for basic necessities or 
to prevent harm.131  
 The treatment of rape by the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals under-
scores the principle that rape occurs where there is no consent, and 
that this can be proved by demonstrating an environment so innately 
coercive that actual consent is highly improbable. The MCA, on the 
other hand, ignores this reality by narrowly defining rape in only 
forceful terms. 
 The MCA’s reliance on force and threat of force not only ignores 
coercive environments but also ignores coercive relationships that 
could lead to nonconsensual sex. Coercive relationships include 
situations where victims submit to perpetrators because of an imbal-
ance of power; that is, when an authority’s position has such a great 
influence over the victim that true consent is impossible.  
 This form of coercive nonconsent is not only seen in international 
law132 but also in U.S. domestic law. For example, in New Jersey, 
state law prohibits without exception any sexual relationship be-
tween prison guards and inmates.133 In explaining the underlying 
purpose of its state law prohibiting sexual relationships between 
guards and inmates, the New Jersey Superior Court in New Jersey v. 
Martin stated that the legislature “reasonably recognized the un-
equal positions of power and inherent coerciveness of the situation 
which could not be overcome by evidence of apparent assent.”134 Sim-
ply put, there is such an imbalance of power between prison guards 
and prisoners that any sexual act automatically constitutes noncon-
sensual sex and is a per se violation of the law. 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Goldstone, supra note 5, at 285. 
 130. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-1(2), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(2), 
8(2)(e)(vi)-1(2) (“The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coer-
cive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent.”). 
 131. Amnesty International Fact Sheet, supra note 57. 
 132. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Chapter 13, §177 (stating that force 
is equivalent to “exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected and at the mercy 
of the perpetrator’s influence”), translated in 32 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL 
CODES 112-13 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002). 
 133. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2001). 
 134. New Jersey v. Martin, 561 A.2d 631, 636 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989). 
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 As noted above, international tribunals recognize that nonconsent 
is an essential element in the crime of rape. Moreover, they define 
consent to include whether, given the circumstances, the victim could 
truly give consent. Therefore, the MCA’s emphasis on force and coer-
cion and exclusion of other forms of nonconsent sharply contrasts 
with international definitions and disregards an important aspect of 
rape—environments and relationships so coercive in nature that 
genuine consent by a victim is not possible. 
 Second, unlike the international tribunals, the MCA does not rec-
ognize forcible oral sex as rape because it limits penetration to either 
the “anal or genital opening.”135 In contrast, the ICTY in Furundzija 
first found oral sex to constitute rape.136 Similarly, the ICTR’s broad 
and nonmechanical definition of rape would likely encompass the 
same.137 Furthermore, the ICC, in addition to defining rape as pene-
tration of the anal or genital opening, also defines rape as penetra-
tion “of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator.”138 
Regrettably, the MCA, by restricting rape to penetration of the anal 
or genital opening, departs from the international tribunals’ recogni-
tion of oral sex as rape.   
 The MCA narrowly defines rape contrary to the international ad 
hoc tribunals and permanent court. It ignores widely accepted un-
derstandings of rape during wartime—that force is not required and 
that oral sex is rape. Moreover, by redefining rape in this manner, 
the MCA severely restricts the ability to prosecute perpetrators of 
these acts.139 It creates impunity for perpetrators who do not use 
force but that take advantage of coercive circumstances. Further-
more, by not recognizing oral sex as rape, it minimizes the severity of 
these acts on victims. 
2.   Narrow Definition of Sexual Assault 
 As with rape, the MCA also narrowly defines sexual assault or 
abuse by requiring force, coercion, or threat of force contrary to in-
                                                                                                                     
 135. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 950v(b)(21), 
6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(G), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).  
 136. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Dec. 10, 1998).  
 137. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 598 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(defining rape as “physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under cir-
cumstances which are coercive”). 
 138. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-1(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1(1), 
8(2)(e)(vi)-1(1). 
 139. See Press Release, Amnesty International USA, Amnesty International Pro-
foundly Disappointed By Congress’ Passage of Detainee Legislation (Sept. 28, 2006), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?lang=e&id=ENGUSA20060929001 [hereinafter 
Amnesty International Press Release]. 
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ternational law.140 Obviously, this raises similar issues concerning 
the narrowness of the definition and its subsequent exclusion of 
many acts of sexual assault that do not necessitate force or coercion. 
In addition to this underinclusion contrary to international stan-
dards, the MCA further narrows the definition by requiring “sexual 
contact.”141  
 This requirement is contrary to many decisions of international 
tribunals where physical contact was not required to find a violation 
of sexual abuse. For example, the ICTR in the Akayesu case defined 
sexual violence in such broad terms that it did not require an act of 
penetration or physical contact, thereby establishing that sexual vio-
lence included forced nudity.142 And even the ICTY—which did not 
adopt the ICTR’s broad definition of rape—found that forcing women 
to dance naked constituted sexual abuse.143 Similarly, the ICC does 
not require any physical contact. It defines sexual violence as an “act 
of a sexual nature,” thereby including nudity and sexual entertain-
ment.144  
 The Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur accounted widespread 
acts such as strip searches, forced parading or dancing naked in front 
of soldiers, or performing domestic chores while naked as violence 
against women during wartime.145 The ad hoc tribunals and the ICC 
recognized this reality and adopted interpretations to ensure these 
acts would not go unpunished; however, the MCA specifically did not. 
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC, the MCA has a sexual con-
tact requirement for sexual abuse and assault which would not rec-
ognize acts such as forced nakedness or sexual entertainment.146 As a 
result, some of the outrages of Abu Ghraib, such as piling naked pris-
oners on top of one another, or forcing prisoners to strip and wear 
                                                                                                                     
 140. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 950v(b)(22), 
6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(H), 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 141. Id. The MCA defines Sexual Assault or Abuse as “[t]he act of a person who forci-
bly or with coercion or threat of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in sexual 
contact with one or more persons, or causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, one or more 
persons to engage in sexual contact.” Id. § 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(H) (emphasis added). 
 142. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 143. Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 772-73. 
 144. ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 74, arts. 7(1)(g)-6(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6(1) (“The 
perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused 
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force 
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological op-
pression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine 
consent.” (emphasis added)). 
 145. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Integration of 
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, ¶ 44, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73 (Jan. 23, 2001) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy).  
 146. See Copelon, supra note 115 (stating the MCA’s definition of rape is contrary to 
international and domestic definitions).  
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female underwear on their head, would not constitute sexual abuse 
or assault.147  
3.   Defining Torture with Intent 
 The ICTY and ICTR found rape to constitute torture when it is 
used to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, or discriminate against a per-
son under one’s custody for purposes of interrogation or punish-
ment.148 That is, rape is severe physical or mental pain or suffering 
and, when used for one of the above purposes, constitutes torture. 
However, the MCA’s definition of torture departs from this interna-
tional standard by requiring specific intent.  
 The MCA defines torture as “[t]he act of a person who commits, or 
conspires or attempts to commit, an act specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffer-
ing incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his 
custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining information 
or a confession, punishment, intimidation, coercion, or any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind.”149  
 Requiring specific intent for torture effectively eliminates the idea 
of rape as torture because it makes it nearly impossible to assess the 
mind of the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.150 In Foca Ap-
peal, the Appeals Chamber rejected the defendants’ argument that 
their acts of rape did not constitute torture because they did not “in-
tend to inflict pain or suffering, rather that their aims were purely 
sexual in nature.”151 In doing so, the Chamber affirmed that the act 
for the prohibited purpose had to be intentional, not the infliction of 
pain or suffering.152 Unfortunately, the MCA’s requirement of intent 
does not follow this understanding and will therefore virtually elimi-
nate the notion that rape is torture. 
                                                                                                                     
 147. Id.; see also CCR Press Release, supra note 115 (arguing that some of the outrages 
at Abu Ghraib, such as forced nudity, would not constitute sexual abuse under MCA’s defi-
nition). 
 148. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 163 (Dec. 
10, 1998) (finding that “the use of rape in the course of detention and interrogation” is tor-
ture); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 597-98 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(stating that rape is a violation of personal integrity and is torture when used for the pur-
poses of interrogation, humiliation, degradation, punishment, or discrimination). 
 149. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(A), 120 
Stat. 2600 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 150. See Copelon, supra note 115. 
 151. Foca Appeal, supra note 67, ¶ 137. 
 152. Id. ¶ 153. 
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4.   Exclusion of Outrages upon Personal Dignity and Humiliating 
and Degrading Acts 
 As previously stated, the Military Commissions Act excludes the 
bedrock principle of Common Article 3: “outrages upon personal dig-
nity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”153 The ad 
hoc tribunals relied on this provision when finding that rape and 
sexual abuse constitute crimes against humanity or acts of genocide.  
 For example, in the Foca case, the Trial Chamber convicted the 
defendant Kovac for forcing women and girls to dance nude on a ta-
ble.154 In doing so, the Chamber found that the harm humiliated and 
degraded the victims regardless of the defendant’s intention.155 Simi-
larly, the ICTR in the Akayesu case found that forced nudity is a hu-
miliating and degrading act and held that it was a crime against 
humanity.156  
 In lieu of this provision, the MCA prohibits “cruel or inhuman 
treatment,” defined as “intend[ing] to inflict severe or serious physi-
cal or mental pain or suffering . . . including serious physical 
abuse.”157 It further defines serious physical pain to include bodily in-
jury involving substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, burn 
or physical disfigurement, or significant loss or impairment of a bod-
ily function;158 while defining severe mental pain as prolonged mental 
harm caused by infliction of severe physical pain, administration of 
mind-altering substance, threat of imminent death, or threat of an-
other person’s imminent death.159 It defines serious mental pain simi-
larly except the mental pain does not need to be prolonged, only seri-
ous and nontransitory.160 
 It is clear that by the standards of this definition, along with the 
exclusion of “ ‘outrages against personal dignity, including humiliat-
ing and degrading treatment,’ ” the MCA precludes many sexual of-
fenses that do not rise to the level of rape or sexual abuse, such as 
forced nudity or sexualized harassment, from prosecution.161 This 
would include many of the violations that occurred at Abu Ghraib 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Common Article 3, supra note 101, at art. 3(1)(c); Military Commissions Act §§ 
950v(b)(12), 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(B) (defining Cruel or Inhuman Treatment as “an act intended 
to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffer-
ing incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical abuse, upon another within 
his custody or control”). 
 154. Foca, supra note 56, ¶¶ 772-74. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
 157. Military Commissions Act §§ 950v(b)(12), 6(b)(1)(B)(d)(1)(B).  
 158. Id. § 6(b)(1)(d)(2)(D). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Copelon, supra note 115 (quoting Common Article 3, supra note 101, art. 
3(1)(c)). 
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towards detainees because, while they would constitute “outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment,” they would not constitute “cruel and inhuman treat-
ment.”162 For example, stripping, hooding, and forcing detainees to 
simulate sexual acts or assume humiliating positions, which occurred 
at Abu Ghraib, would not constitute sexual abuse by the standards of 
the MCA.   
5.   No International Source of Law in Interpreting Common 
Article 3 Prohibitions 
 Notwithstanding a potential separation of powers issue,163 the 
MCA prohibits U.S. courts from using foreign law or international 
sources of law in interpreting Common Article 3 prohibitions.164 This 
is contrary to U.S. military justice past practices of using interna-
tional law to interpret Geneva Conventions.165 Despite this past prac-
tice, the prohibition on using international interpretations would 
render the forward-moving jurisprudence on rape and sexual vio-
lence by the international tribunals and the subsequent codification 
by the ICC fruitless in U.S. courts.166   
 The MCA’s ban on the use of international interpretations pre-
cludes established interpretations of rape. For example, the defini-
tions of rape and sexual assault in the MCA provide for instances of 
“threat of force,” which has been interpreted by international tribu-
nals, such as the ICTY, to eliminate any requirement that the victim 
show resistance.167 Also, some legal scholars argue that “coercion or 
force or threat of force” is just a “reformulation” of Akayesu’s “circum-
stances which are coercive” by pointing to the Furundzija Trial 
Chamber’s statement that “the prohibition [of sexual violence under 
international law] embraces all serious abuses of a sexual nature in-
flicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a person by means of 
                                                                                                                     
 162. See David Scheffer, How the Compromise Detainee Legislation Guts Common Arti-
cle 3, JURIST LEGAL NEWS & RES., Sept. 25, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/09/ 
how-compromise-detainee-legislation.php (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. See Judge Patricia Wald, Lecture at the Florida State University College of Law, 
Military Commissions Act 2006: U.S. Attitude Toward International Law (Oct. 25, 2006) 
(videorecording available at the Florida State University College of Law Research Center) 
(discussing that the MCA’s provision prohibiting the use of international law may be a 
separation of powers issue because the judicial branch, not Congress, has authority to in-
terpret the law).  
 164. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. 2600 
(2006) (stating that, in construing Common Article 3, “[n]o foreign or international source 
of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts of the United States in inter-
preting the prohibitions”). 
 165. See Copelon, supra note 115. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 
THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/ 
sierleon0103.pdf. 
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coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading 
and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”168 However, the MCA’s ban 
on the use of international sources of law would preclude these estab-
lished interpretations of rape and sexual violence. 
 Moreover, it is unclear whether rape would automatically satisfy 
the element of “severe physical or mental pain or suffering” for the 
crime of torture without the established jurisprudence of the tribu-
nals because of the MCA’s narrow definition for “severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering.”169 Thus, the MCA further deteriorates the 
idea that rape constitutes torture. 
 Furthermore, Common Article 3 is a provision of international law 
and, as such, the vast majority of its interpretation and meaning re-
sides within international bodies, such as the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross and the International Tribunals. Therefore, the 
inability of U.S. courts to use this widely established and accepted 
body of law will restrict them to the limited body of U.S. sources of 
law regarding this provision and lead to potentially absurd results.170 
 The prohibition of international sources of law combined with the 
narrow definition of rape and sexual violence contrary to interna-
tional standards halt the progressive strides of successfully prosecut-
ing rape and sexual violence during wartime. Furthermore, the MCA 
creates “retroactive immunity” for any U.S. agents implicated in vio-
lating Common Article 3 prohibitions,171 including any mistreatment 
of detainees held at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.172  
 The Military Commissions Act, by expressly enumerating Rape 
and Sexual Assault as a grave breach, goes further than the Geneva 
Conventions and is in line with the ICC statute of enumerating Rape 
as a War Crime. However, the MCA’s narrow definition, along with 
its prohibition of the use of international jurisprudence, makes 
prosecuting rape and sexual abuse during wartime a near impossible 
task while simultaneously granting immunity for any past acts. By 
providing both impunity and immunity, the MCA’s treatment of rape 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Wolfgang Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence Under 
International Criminal Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 133 (2007) (emphasis omitted) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 169. Military Commissions Act § 950v(b)(11). 
 170. Scheffer, supra note 162 (questioning how U.S. legal sources, such as past U.S. 
case law or secondary sources by U.S. legal scholars that cite to international or foreign 
sources of law, will be treated). 
 171. Amnesty International Press Release, supra note 139 (“Retroactive immunity for 
those who have been implicated in creating policies or participating in abuse and other 
acts long believed to be torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”). 
 172. See CCR Press Release, supra note 115 (“[T]he bill provides retroactive immunity 
for U.S [sic] military and intelligence officials for the torture and abuse of detainees, in-
cluding the widely condemned horrors which occurred at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo.”). 
2008] MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 549 
 
and sexual violence is regressive in comparison with international 
standards. 
IV.   CRITIQUE–IS THE MCA’S TREATMENT OF RAPE AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE GOOD POLICY? 
 In determining whether the Military Commissions Act is good pol-
icy one must weigh what is gained from the Act and what is lost. In 
doing so, I conclude that the MCA is not good policy for three rea-
sons: (1) it will not help, but will undermine, the war on terror; (2) it 
creates dangerous precedent for other nations to use or to influence 
impending tribunals; and (3) it negatively contributes to how rape 
and sexual violence are viewed in society and in law. 
A.   The MCA Undermines the War on Terror 
 The Bush Administration argues that the Military Commissions 
Act is an essential tool for fighting the war on terror.173 In essence, it 
claims that, without the commissions and procedures created by the 
Act, terrorists and their supporters would escape punishment be-
cause the criminal justice system is ill-suited to prosecute the unique 
and nonconventional aspects of terrorist organizations. Moreover, the 
Bush Administration argues that the real threat and danger terror-
ists pose make international practices no longer applicable.174 The 
White House essentially argues that times have changed and estab-
lished practices are “obsolete” and thus require revision.175 Further-
more, the Administration argues that the requirements of the long-
established Common Article 3 provision are “vague” and, therefore, 
its scope and interpretation require clarification.176  
 First, Common Article 3 is not vague. There is a body of law, in-
cluding both international and domestic, which clearly defines the 
scope of the obligations under Common Article 3.177 Also, the Interna-
tional Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) has defined the standards as 
acts which the public would find “particularly revolting.”178 Moreover, 
the ad hoc tribunals have stated that humiliation “must be real and 
serious and must be so intense that the reasonable person would be 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Pres. Bush Press Conference, supra note 102.  
 174. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George W. 
Bush, U.S. President (Jan. 25, 2002) (the now infamous so-called “torture memo”). 
 175. Id. (stating that the old rules of the Geneva Conventions now seem “quaint” and 
“obsolete”). 
 176. Pres. Bush Press Conference, supra note 102. 
 177. See Katherine Newell Bierman, Counterterrorism Counsel for the U.S. Program, 
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (July 19, 2006), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/25/usdom14072_txt.htm (stating that U.S. and interna-
tional courts have both interpreted Common Article 3). 
 178. Id. 
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outraged.”179 Furthermore, the U.S. has long trained military per-
sonnel on these standards without concerns about vagueness.180 
 Second, developing new standards that carve out exceptions to 
clearly established minimum guarantees creates a “slippery slope.”181 
This occurs where the exception through time and practice ceases to 
be an exception but rather a norm and consequently, new exceptions 
of greater latitude are allowed.182 Thereby, it creates a dangerous 
practice that becomes justified in the perpetrator’s mind on the basis 
that if slight mistreatment produced certain results or did not pro-
duce any results, even better results could be obtained if a little more 
was applied.183 Therefore, allowing for mistreatment, however slight, 
increases the likelihood that the intensity of the mistreatment will 
follow as perpetrators continually push the limits.184 
 Moreover, allowing mistreatment would not contribute to winning 
the crucial hearts and minds necessary for the war on terror, but 
would rather significantly undermine it. The U.S. Army’s counterin-
surgency manual states that those who employ abusive techniques    
“ ‘lose moral legitimacy’ ” and, therefore, “ ‘lose the war.’ ”185 It fur-
ther states that “ ‘torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading 
treatment is never a morally permissible option, even in situations 
where lives depend on gaining information.’ ”186 Furthermore, as Kofi 
Annan stated during his tenure as U.N. Secretary-General, the U.S. 
is in danger of “playing into the hands of the terrorists” when it 
“abandon[s] the moral high ground.”187 
 In addition to contributing to a loss of moral authority, the MCA 
weakens the U.S. standing as a leader in human rights.188 Human 
rights organizations and the international community criticize the 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Human Rights Watch, Annan Blasts Global Failure on Darfur Horror: States 
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07/global14793.htm [hereinafter HRW Annan Article] (quoting Kofi Annan in a criticism of 
the U.S.: “Once we adopt a policy of making exceptions to these rules or excusing breaches 
of them, no matter how narrow, we are on a slippery slope. The line cannot be held half 
way down. We must defend it at the top.”). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Human Rights Watch, The Legal Prohibition Against Torture, 
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 187. HRW Annan Article, supra note 181. 
 188. Amnesty International Press Release, supra note 139. 
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Act’s establishment of new standards that fall critically short of the 
recognized minimum principles that acknowledge the fundamental 
treatment afforded to every human being and are enshrined as cer-
tain inalienable rights in the U.S. Constitution. In doing so, they ar-
gue that instead of the U.S. leading the way in human rights, it has 
compromised its standards and thereby lost a bit of its standing 
around the world.189 
 Finally, there is much evidence to suggest that little would be 
gained in the war on terror because rarely does reliable intelligence 
come from abusive techniques.190 That is, information obtained by 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment often is false and profes-
sional interrogators therefore view using this treatment as ineffec-
tive and unjustified.191  
B.   The MCA Creates Dangerous Precedent for Other Governments to 
Follow 
 Carving out exceptions to universally applied minimum treatment 
standards creates a dangerous precedent for other governments to 
follow. Enemies of the U.S. will use the newly created American 
standards of treatment against captured U.S. soldiers.192 Moreover, it 
will also embolden rogue governments or groups to continue employ-
ing inhumane treatment, all in the name of following the United 
States.193 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism expressed concern that, since the United States has taken 
the lead in countering terrorism, other governments will use the 
MCA as a model to formulate their own domestic counterterrorism 
legislation.194 Not only will this adoption lead to the chipping away of 
the fundamental principles of Common Article 3, but it will also set a 
dangerous precedent. 
 It is unclear how the MCA may affect the decisions of hybrid tri-
bunals, such as those in Sierra Leone and Cambodia, which have yet 
to render any decisions regarding rape or sexual violence. Although 
the statutes of these tribunals are based on the Rome Statute, it is 
unknown how rape and sexual violence will be defined. Therefore, 
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the MCA may be used as evidence of state practice and its narrow 
treatment of rape and sexual violence may be followed. If so, there 
will be a significant decline in the number of prosecutions and con-
victions of these crimes, a tragic departure from the hard-fought vic-
tories of the ad hoc tribunals. 
C.   The MCA Negatively Affects How Rape and Sexual Violence Are 
Viewed in Society and in Law 
 Rape laws and jurisprudence affect how society views sexual vio-
lence and shapes our cultural attitude toward it.195 Prohibiting forced 
sex defines rape and sexual violence in narrow terms and potentially 
creates an attitude where the victim, rather than the perpetrator, is 
judged. That is, when force cannot be shown, a judgment may emerge 
that it was the victim who did not act reasonably. 
 Laws prohibiting rape and sexual violence, in and of themselves, 
are not enough. In order for true change to occur within any society, 
the society must ensure that its laws are enforced.196 This occurs 
when society witnesses that conduct is no longer tolerated and those 
who participate in such conduct are held accountable. The MCA’s 
narrow treatment of rape and sexual violence will make prosecutions 
for the vast majority of sexual crimes committed by those subjected 
to its provisions so difficult that impunity will replace accountability.  
 The MCA negatively contributes to how the crimes of rape and 
sexual violence during wartime are defined in customary interna-
tional law because its provisions are contrary to international stan-
dards. The Act, while prohibiting rape and sexual violence in accor-
dance with international law, is at odds with the manner in which 
these standards are defined.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The MCA creates a culture of impunity for crimes of rape and 
sexual violence during wartime. Impunity fosters continuance, which 
creates norms and standards in society. Not only is this tragic for the 
victims of sexual violence and their hard-fought victories, but also for 
the United States. In our fight against terrorism, we must not forget 
to maintain our moral standing and enshrined national principles. A 
former U.S. Navy General Counsel recently declared: 
We need to be clear. Cruelty disfigures our national character. It 
is incompatible with our constitutional order, with our laws, and 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on 
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with our most prized values. Cruelty can be as effective as torture 
in destroying human dignity, and there is no moral distinction be-
tween one and the other. To adopt and apply a policy of cruelty 
anywhere within this world is to say that our forefathers were 
wrong about their belief in the rights of man, because there is no 
more fundamental right than to be safe from cruel and inhumane 
treatment. Where cruelty exists, law does not.197 
 While there is still much work to be done in ensuring the effective 
prosecutions of rape and sexual violence during wartime, the inter-
national tribunals’ jurisprudence and the permanent court’s codifica-
tion of rape and sexual violence have made progressive strides. Re-
grettably, the Military Commissions Act runs contrary to these ef-
forts. In doing so, it runs contrary to international standards and 
creates an acceptance for sexual violence where there should be none. 
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